SF 6218 31 March 53 23 Field 4 Section RCE with Dog
SF 5935 Allied Forces Radio Service Tokyo Japan
SF 6993 PPCLI. Note US Marine Corps helmet cover on the MK IV July 53
SF 6757 3 R22R 1 June 53 with the new British Sterling machinegun introduced that year
SF 7076 Chow 3 RCR mess Aug Sept 53
SF 7059 3 RCR Reserve with 50's 7 July 53
Sf 6788 14 R22R June 53
SF 6472 Commonwealth co operations April 53
SF 6962 June 53 Note that throughout these photos of Korea Canadians wear an assortment of helmets from MK II, III and IV to US Helmets. The man at right wears a MK IV with Commonwealth sign painted on the front.
SF 6971 A Coy PPCLI Coffee break 2 July 53
SF 7135 3 R22R 19 July 53
SF 6804 June 53
SF 6334 Brig Allard and Bogart Visit 1 R22R 12 April 53
SF 6803 June 53
SF 5658 Maj Gen Alston Roberts West investiture Korea 19 Nov 52 RCR MM and MC
SF 5658 R22R combat Korea 4 Dec 52.
CC-6593-98 Medals awarded for korea 1952 If anyone knows who these man are please let me know, they are not named in the caption
SF 1775 the luxurious quarters of the 25 CIB Senior Chaplain Protestant
SF 5647 20 Nov 52 Tokyo
SF 5652 20 Nov 52 On leave in Tokyo
SF 6739 June 53 Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw performing helicopter supply
CC 7140 RCR on return from Korea circa July 1953
SF 5748 RCR with folding stretcher Korea Dec 52
SF 5765 Red Cross Nurses doing their part in Korea December 1952
SF 5776 Christmas 1952
SF 5758 Christmas in Korea 1952 along the 38th!
SF 5760 sorting 25 CIB Christmas mail 20 Dec 52
SF 5752 B Coy 1 RCR take over positions in Korea 19 Dec 1952.
SF 5859 Carlings for Christmas 1952
SF 5811 Circa January 1953
SF 5737 17 Dec 1952 building up their cover
SF 1618 2 PPCLI move up to Front in style 21 May 51
SF 1403 25 Bde on way to Korea 20 April 51 R22R
SF 1598 Sigs on way to front with kids 19 May 51.
SF 1258 RCR Farewell Dance Fort Lewis 16 April 51 Center Rocky and right R A Keane
SF 1019 Departure Seattle 28 March 51
SF 1023 Departure Seattle 28 March 51
SF 1600 Member of RCR rests 20 May 51
SF 1650 25 CIB in action LSH 25 May 51
SF 1406 Keeping in shape on board ship to Korea 20 April 51
SF 1281 PPCLI in combat 13-16 April 51 2
SF 1291 PPCLI with BREN and cap badges turned backwards in combat 13-16 April 51
SF 1403 25 Bde on way to Korea 20 April 51 R22R
SF 1343 PPCLI 17 April 51 Combat area
SF 1644 Commonwealth CO visits 25 CIB 22 May 51
SF 1585 Keeping Communications 15 May 51
SF 1638 2 RCHA with half track in Korea 22 May 51
SF 1505 Member of PPCLI talking with Korean Press May 51
SF 1515 Rocket Launching Tests and Demo 10 May 51
SF 1514 Rocket Launching test 10 May 51
SF 1489 25 CIB Ord Co at Pusan 6 May 51
SF 1369 M-10 Korea Cdn Armd Corps April 51
SF 1443 A parachute trained officer of the R22R takes a nap en route to Korea 20 April 51
SF 1419 en route to Korea 20 April 51 Hand to Hand combat
SF 1421 After trims and Hand to Hand they eat 20 April 51
SF 1755 RCHA in action 28 May 51 taking cover from rain.
SF 1532 Member RCR Ex Charlie Horse 11 May 51
SF1020 28 March 51 departure Seattle
SF 1763 2 RCR casualties 25 CIB field Am 30 May
SF 1753 RCR casualties 30 May 51 forward
SF-1154 Fort Lewis USA Lord Alexander, Def Min Claxton and Rockingham 15 April 51
RCR Casualties 30 May 51 SF 1751
RCR Casualties 30 May 51 SF 1749
PHOTOS 25th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE KOREA 1954 - 1955
PHOTOS 25th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE KOREA 1953 - 1954
PHOTOS 25TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE KOREA 1950 - 1951
SF 6011 Jack Booth Cartoon Korea 19 March 1953
SF 6011 Jack Booth Cartoon Korea 19 March 1953
Not even war can stop the Canadian from slipping on the skates and playing hockey
Below are colour photos from the Library & Archives Canada ZK Series
SF10169 BW in Korea
WC 9248A R22R return from Korea 52 53
SF 9003 20 Feb 54 BW
WC 9330 RCR return from Korea jazzed up in Japanese made patches 16 March 53
SF 8017 3 PPCLI Regt Police Officer July Aug 53
SF 8215 sewing patches on battle dress Sept 53
SF 6011 Jack Booth Cartoon Korea 19 March 1953
Although shelling and enemy patrolling in the area had somewhat increased, there was no intelligence for an impending attack. Over the night of 2-3 May, "A" Company moved through "C" Company positions in order to mount an ambush patrol. They got more than they bargained for when they ran smack into a strong enemy force moving on Hill 187. At 10:30 p.m. the RCR skirmished with the enemy losing their patrol leader and half their patrol. The remainder withdrew and "C" Company went forward. They too found the enemy too strong to tackle and had to withdraw as the enemy plastered the area with artillery. With the Canadians moving back, the Communists attacked. At 1:30 a.m. it was now the RCR that directed artillery on top of the attacking enemy. This resulted in their withdrawal and the RCR reoccupying their destroyed positions on Hill 187. This was the last major engagement of the conflict. Over the next three months things went back to a routine of patrolling and building up defenses. The Commonwealth artillery remained active quelling many enemy concentrations before they became a threat.
On 27 July 1953, the talks at Panmunjom finally yielded results when a ceasefire agreement was signed. The Jamestown Line became the demarcation line. It was agreed that both sides would move back 2,000 meters and establish a Demilitarized Zone. The Canadians worked on these new positions and settled in. With the fighting basically over, they turned into border police. A final rotation of troops occurred at the beginning of 1954 which brought the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders of Canada), The Queens Own Rifles of Canada and the Canadian Guards. At the end of that year it was decided to bring most of the 25th Brigade home. Only the QOR remained until the spring of 1955. The last Canadian unit in Korea was the Canadian Medical Detachment; it returned home in June 1957.
With the ceasefire came decades of an uneasy peace between the two Koreas. While many books and articles praise the UN involvement and its ultimate success in stemming aggression, the author argues that this claim rings hollow. Korea is still divided with a nuclear armed totalitarian regime in the North and a free republic in the South. One spends most of its money on military power while its people starve while the other has become a beacon of democracy, freedom and success. Therefore how can the UN intervention be deemed a success? It is also obvious that Korea was the beginning of international half measures and the wasteful concept of limited war. It also emphasized the failure of the UN as an international body for peace. The UN was, and largely still is, a boxing ring with totalitarian regimes in one corner and nations representing freedom, rights and democracy in the other; the two main players since 1945 being the communist dictators and the democracies. It could never work and it has not worked. Today dictators still take their seats at the UN and use it as a forum to spread their ideological vitriol.
Now, in Canada's capital, we are actually debating whether a monument to the victims of communism should be built. The enemies of freedom and democracy continue to create excuses why it should not be erected. They complain about the suitability of building sites and some are even afraid of offending communists. Since 1945 Canada has been an enemy of communism. In fact a communist party, like a neo-Nazi party should not even be allowed to exist in Canada. No group seeking a form of totalitarian regime should be allowed to exist. Since 1945 Canadians have fought against communism or have been trained to destroy any attempt by communist nations to attack free democracies. The author was amongst those men and women. Those opposing such a monument should be ashamed of themselves.
In Korea 26,791 Canadians served as part of the Army, Air Force and Navy. After the ceasefire 7,000 Canadians remained along the DMZ until 1955. During the actual conflict from 1950 to 1953 Canada had 1,558 casualties with 516 of those being killed or later died of wounds. Ever since 1953 Canadian veterans of Korea have suffered the ill effects of the war. Korea was a cesspool of disease when they arrived. The fields and hills in which the Canadians dug their defenses and lived and fought in were fertilized with human feces. They were given all sorts of unproven inoculations to deal with the spread of these diseases.
Despite my opinion of the overall success of the UN involvement, these Canadians should not be forgotten. They volunteered to serve for many reasons however once they were on the ground in Korea they quickly understood the gravity of the situation and what it meant for the lives of the Korean people. They should be honored as fighters for peace, freedom and democracy. Those that died or were physically and mentally wounded should not only be venerated for their sacrifice but they should also be included in the monument for the victims of communism along with the tens of millions of others around the world.
The 3 PPCLI took over from 1 PPCLI and were trained to conduct counter-attacks to re-occupy previously lost ground by the British 29th Brigade. This culminated in an attack on the "Hook." This was the western end of a hill/ridge line with Hill 146 at the eastern end. The Hook overlooked the southern portion of the Sami-chon valley in UN hands so the enemy knew of its importance. They mounted several attacks to seize it. The Imperial Black Watch of the 29th Brigade were on the ridge line when a battalion of the enemy attacked on 18 November and made a lodgment. In order for the full weight of the British to be felt in their counter-attack, 3 PPCLI with tanks of the LdSH occupied Hill 146. After several days on 146, they returned to the Brigade which was training to return to the line.
The 1st Commonwealth Division returned to the line at the end of November, squashing its three brigades forward with each brigade fronting two battalions. This method, rather than having two brigades forward with three battalions each in the line, meant that a battalion for each brigade could be held back as a floating reserve. The Canadians were positioned on the left with the R22R at Yongdong and the PPCLI on top of the Hook with a company of the RCR. The remaining RCR companies were in reserve. Not much occurred up until January 1953 so the men spent their time fortifying their defenses, laying wire, planting mines, booby traps and digging tunnels. Tunnels proved effective to hold positions in Korea because most of the time the enemy shelled UN positions flat and then attacked. UN forces could take cover in these tunnels and if necessary, call fire down on their own positions to destroy the enemy swarming on top. Overseeing the construction of these stronger positions was the 23rd Field Squadron Royal Canadian Engineers and local workers. While this work continued, only small scale operations were mounted. This amounted to the usual ambush, fighting and recon patrols. During this period it was the British and Australians of the 28th Brigade on Hills 355-227 to the right that endured several intense attacks and suffered many casualties.
By Christmas, the RCR had moved on to the Hook while the PPCLI went into Brigade reserve. The R22R remained on Yongdong. After some patrolling, the 1st Commonwealth Division went into reserve. Its artillery remained in support of US forces taking over the line. The Division then maintained its readiness by mounting several Battalion, Brigade and Divisional exercises. They also took on overflow troops from the South Korean Army known as Katcoms (Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth Forces). These troops also had to be trained before entering the line. The ROK Forces manpower influx had outgrown its ability to clothe and equip their men. Therefore many Koreans were clothed, equipped and trained to join UN Forces. The first Katcoms joined the Canadians in March of 1953.
Another rotation of Canadian units occurred at the beginning of 1953 and saw the 3rd Battalions of the RCR and R22R replace their 1st Battalions. The "A" Squadron of LdSH replaced their "B" Squadron and the 81st RCA replaced 1 RCHA. The 59th Independent Field Squadron RCE and Service Corps units replaced those previously deployed. They took up the center of the Commonwealth Division line on 6 April from Hill 355 across the Sami-chon River to the Hook. Command of the Brigade changed to Brigadier J.V. Allard. Fighting continued in varying intensity along the UN line with the Canadians only repelling one significant assault. This occurred on the night of 19 April and impacted the positions of 3 RCR on the southern portion of Hill 187. After only a short period of time to fix and build up defenses, the enemy struck.
By April 1952, the 2nd Battalions of the R22R and RCR were replaced by their 1st Battalions. 2 RCHA was replaced by 1 RCHA and in June, "C" Squadron LSH was replaced by "B" Squadron. The 25th Brigade got Brigadier M.P. Bogert as their new commander on 27 April 1952 as it held ground along the Jamestown Line. The Canadians took over Hill 355 while the US took the line west of the Sami-chon River.
Since the line remained basically static, the military brass enforced a vigorous patrol schedule. At least one major fighting patrol of known enemy positions was to be made per week by each Battalion. Every three days one enemy prisoner was to be taken. As per limited war strategy, it usually amounted to high losses by the wrong side. The patrols would move out, inflict or take casualties and then return over the same ground never actually taking or holding ground, a wasteful form of warfare reminiscent of the trenches of WWI. The difference being that in the Korean War forward movement was possible. A patrol during the Korean War could be a couple of men up to the size of a Company. They could be covert or directly supported up-close by their own tanks and artillery. The Canadian tanks and artillery moved forward with the infantry to establish a fire base in the valley close to the objective while the infantry went up to the enemy positions which were usually on opposing hills. Smaller covert patrols were mounted to ambush the enemy and gather intelligence. If a prisoner could be taken they were taken, however the earlier prisoner policy was discontinued.
In May the Commonwealth Division was asked to provide one Canadian and one British Rifle Company to act as guards for a Prisoner of War Camp on Koje-do Island. A Company of the RCR performed this role until 10 June. It was also during June that the 25th Brigade was pulled from the line and placed in Divisional Reserve. They went on leave, helped to build up the Kansas and Wyoming Line and assisted in attempting to build up bridges over the Imjin during the monsoon. This effort was only partially successful with several bridges collapsing into the river.
The Canadians went forward again in August and endured more intense enemy patrols and shelling. The Canadian Brigade was positioned between Pauljol-gol and Kojanharisaemal. The R22R were on the left, the RCR in the middle and the PPCLI to the right. They not only endured a downpour of artillery and mortar shells but also the torrential rain of the monsoon. This meant constantly ducking for cover and then building up cover that had collapsed in the monsoon conditions.
In October, as the shelling and rain continued, the RCR made an effort to curb the enemy’s aggressiveness. A raid on Hill 227 by "B" Company of the RCR on 12-13 October was ambushed before it got to its objective. On the 16th a patrol from the PPCLI contacted an alert enemy around Hill 217. This enemy activity indicated that they were preparing for a major attack. Preceded by heavy bombardments throughout October, on the 23rd the enemy attacked the bastion of Hill 355, which was known as “Little Gibraltar”. With "B" Company of the RCR just having taken over the positions, they found the defences in bad order and the continuing shelling only made things worse. The enemy then attacked. Without effective defensive positions and with communications out, "B" Company had to withdraw to "A" Company positions. The Battalion CO then called fire down on their old positions and the general area of advance of the enemy. A counterattack was mounted by "D" Company from the left and despite tough going and several causalities they retook Hill 355. The line then went quiet again however the Canadian Brigade listed casualties from August to November as being 191 for the RCR , 18 for the PPCLI and 74 for the R22R.
The enemy did not sit idle at the end of 1951. They mounted several attacks on the Division including one on 2-3 November which saw the forward platoon position of RCR withdraw. It has to be remembered that the enemy continued to severely outnumber the Division. The Canadians fought gallantly but could never match the manpower of the enemy. The limited number of men that the Canadians could field also meant a limited amount of supplies could be carried forward. The enemy just kept coming and with overwhelming force being applied and positions sometimes had to be given up. In addition the enemy also had artillery. The beginning of November saw heavy artillery concentrations along the Division front followed by assaults. This meant the loss of Hills 217 and 317 but 1 PPCLI skillfully held their positions through three enemy assaults using a combination of supporting fire and their own fire.
On 9 November R22R had another crack at Hill 166. Although most of the Battalion reached their objectives, they did not secure the peak. The enemy counter-attacked and pushed them off the hill. Also at this time control of the frontline shifted. The US 3rd Division took over Hill 355, the dominating feature of the line. The Canadians now had a seven kilometer front running north-east from the Sami-chon.
Almost immediately the Canadians moved into their new positions, while the enemy hammered the US 3rd on 355 as well as R22R on the far right of the Canadian line. The weather deteriorated into a miserable mix of snow and rain and it was a challenge to keep the front line positions supplied over sodden muddy roads and trails.
Another overwhelming Chinese assault cleared the 3rd off 355 and occupied Hill 227 but R22R held their positions. This put the UN forces in a dangerous position. The enemy now threatened the US supply line and an encirclement of R22R. Chinese artillery continued to fall over 23-25 November and assaults by both Chinese and US forces continued back and forth until on the 25th the US had taken back 355. "D" Company of R22R held out through an exhausting total of four days and nights of hell. On the 27th, with negotiations being renewed, it was decided to stop forward patrolling and to only engage in counter-battery artillery fire. The enemy did not respect the situation and continued its general artillery fire and patrolling. Eventually the UN renewed its campaign with recon patrolling and ambush tactics deployed in December. The PPCLI raided Hill 277 and the RCR Hill 166. By mid-January 1952, the 25th Brigade went into Divisional reserve. They had served continually almost 5 months in the front line. Now they were to establish and build up defensive positions along the Wyoming and Kansas Lines.
The Canadians entered the front lines again in March positioning themselves astride the Sami-Chon River with the RCR and PPCLI to the west of the valley and R22R to the east. With spring upon them, the Chinese attacked. The night of 25 March saw them attempt to raid Hill 132. After two and a half hours of tense fighting, the 1 PPCLI platoon on that hill held and the Chinese withdrew.
With the onset of winter in 1952, the UN line became static until the signing of the ceasefire in 1953. No major battles or assaults took place. The conflict now boiled down to raids, counter-raids, repulsing small scale enemy attacks, patrolling, laying and avoiding booby traps, laying wire, being bombarded by mortars and artillery and burying the dead and caring for the wounded and sick; all this while the talks continued in Panmunjom.
Back on 27 May, the 2 PPCLI was moved from the British 28th Brigade back to the Canadian 25th Brigade. From 2 to 18 June, the Canadians were in reserve south of the Imjin-Hantan junction. The Imjin River in this area flows south-west which created a salient south of the Chinese lines. It was vital that this area remain in UN hands due to its proximity with their supply lines through Seoul-Uijongbu-Chorwon. This salient was kept from enemy hands by vigorous patrolling.
Moving back to the 28th Brigade, 2 PPCLI were assigned the job of keeping the enemy out by establishing a forward patrol base on 6 June. This "limited war" strategy was relatively new and was developed mainly because of limited assets. In effect, these forward bases, some distance from the main line of defense, were used to probe enemy intentions and act as an alarm should the enemy attempt to break through. The RCR were relieved by the R22R (CO Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Dextraze) on 11 June.
After an effort by the US Eighth Army to advance their line north in the east was successful, this new front line basically remained the same until the ceasefire. Meanwhile the Canadians continued patrolling into the hills, valleys and plain of the Chorwon. Large scale patrols were also mounted, supported by the M4A3E8 Sherman tanks of Lord Strathcona's Horse (having replaced their M-10 Tank Destroyers) and the guns of 2 RCHA directed by air observers. They established their base at Chungmasan from which 2 RCHA operated. The Patrols and light aircraft would go out, find a target and if they could not engage the enemy, 2 RCHA were directed to destroy them.
It was at this time that the communists asked for ceasefire talks to begin. In truth this was more to gain military advantage than to actually seriously discuss a peace. The talks, beginning in July, dragged on for two more years while countless human beings were slaughtered, maimed or displaced. Also in July the Commonwealth forces established the 1st Commonwealth Division under the command of Major-General J.H. Cassells. The Division fell under the overall control of the US 1 Corps. They held the Kansas Line from the junction of the Imjin-Hantan for 10,000 meters westward. The 1st Commonwealth Division continued patrolling, protecting the supply route to the Chorwon. Eventually they occupied the salient after Operation MINDEN and Operation COMMANDO. From 28 June to September patrolling continued forward with the PPCLI and R22R patrolling as far forward as Hills 187 and 208. Later in October the 28th Brigade secured Hill 217. After operation COMMANDO a new front line was established dubbed Jamestown. The Commonwealth Division now overlooked the valley of a tributary of the Sami-chon River.
With the completion of COMMANDO, the 1st Commonwealth Division became a more solid fighting force developing an esprit de corps. However between October and November 1951, the first rotation of troops occurred. Now, over a gradual period to allow training by experienced troops, 1 PPCLI replaced 2 PPCLI. One company of the PPCLI saw action straight away in Operation PEPPER-POT. This was devised to probe enemy positions to find out their layout as well as to maintain offensive action against the enemy. On 23 October a company from R22R was assigned Hill 166, "A" company from 1 PPCLI was assigned Hill 156 with a company from the RCR taking what was in between. While considered an overall success, R22R was stopped short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. The Canadians lost five killed and 21 wounded. The enemy lost considerably more.
The Australians were the first under fire and endured relentless attacks before having to withdraw. This exposed the Canadian positions to attack and the enemy began to probe the forward PPCLI positions. The Canadians were soon cut off. However effective air supply and artillery support (the enemy was basically funnelled in the valley and effectively destroyed by artillery and machine gun fire) soon quelled the enemy attack. The Middlesex regiment was able to break through to the PPCLI and a supply route re-established. The PPCLI had lost 10 killed and 23 wounded. The gallant stand against overwhelming numbers, enemy mortars and artillery earned the 2 PPCLI and Australians the US Presidential Unit Citation. On 1 May the enemy offensive wound down. The UN forces along the western line dug in and strengthened their positions while plans were in the works to once again push north beyond the 38th. The enemy had other ideas. They were now shifting their weight to the east against the bulk of the US Eighth Army. It must be remembered that UN assets were quite sparse in comparison to the North Koreans and Chinese. MacArthur had wanted more assets so that an all-out victory could be achieved. In effect what the UN Forces, under the direction of Harry Truman, were doing was dickering around and dying while doing it. The only saving resource of the UN forces was their air power and artillery.
On 21 February 1951 it was decided in Ottawa to move the entire 25th Brigade, as originally contemplated, to Korea. They landed at Pusan in May. With the relief of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, they joined up with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade along the Han River. This was in preparation for the UN's third push beyond the 38th Parallel. On 17 May, as stated above, the vital artillery that came to Korea with the Canadians was immediately in action. This fit in with UN strategy to achieve a strong frontline and prevent another Chinese breakthrough. Meanwhile the dickering continued.
While the UN's material strength, rather than relying on manpower, was utilized to achieve a defendable line, the Chinese strategy was based more on manpower attrition. The 25th Brigade was attached to the US 25th Infantry Division on 24 May and moved with them to positions north-east of Uijongbu. In operation INITIATE, they moved forward in phases to the Kansas Line just south of the Imjin River close behind an armoured / infantry task force dubbed Dolvin. Dolvin rapidly seized ground while the 25th Infantry and the Canadians consolidated. By 27 May they were along the Kansas Line. The following day they moved further north of the 38th Parallel to the base of Hill 467 (Kakhul-bong). This hill fell along the line of advance of 2 RCR under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Angus Keane, ex-FSSF and Lake Superior Regiment. They were assigned to take the hill and the village Chail-li on the other side. Being supported by 2 RHCA (CO Lieutenant Colonel A.J.B. Bailey), the Companies of the RCR were split up on different objectives to take the hill and village. This also meant taking nearby hills (162 and 269) in order to outflank the enemy. On 30 May, in a pouring rain storm, the RCR attacked. Initially all went well accept for "D" Company’s attack on 467. They came under withering machine gun fire. Despite the plan to have each Company seize ground that supported the other, the Chinese were able to work around "A" Company positions in the village. The bad weather prevented "C" Company positions on 269 to engage the Chinese around "A" Company. With "D" Company sticking its neck out too far forward in the attack on 467 and "A" Company now in a precarious situation, Rockingham had no choice but to withdraw "A" and "D" Companies to more defensible positions. The RCR lost six men with an additional 54 wounded.
It was in this chaos that the PPCLI and supporting units arrived in Korea. They landed at Pusan in December and conducted further training in theater at Miryang (between Taegu and Pusan). On 17 February 1951 they became a component of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade  of the US IX Corps of the US Eight Army and entered combat for the first time.
In an attempt to drive the enemy back beyond the 38th Parallel, the Commonwealth Brigade was to attack northwest to high ground around Hoeng-song. They began their advance from the village of Sangsok with initially little opposition. At this time of year it was not just the Chinese and North Koreans to worry about; the weather was wet, cold and miserable and the terrain rose steadily to higher slopes covered in snow. It was during this advance that the PPCLI suffered its first casualties with two killed and one wounded during an attack by "C" Company on Hill 444 on the 22nd of February. Despite a stubborn enemy withdrawal, they advanced 25 kilometers.
On 7 March the push north continued with the objectives of Hill 410 (Australians) and 532 (2 PPCLI). Like the Germans in Italy, the enemy used these tall ridges and hills to defend their withdrawal. The enemy was now moving rapidly back and on 15 March relinquished Seoul to the 1st ROK Division. The US 24th Infantry then made a push to the 38th Parallel west of the Kap'yong River. The Commonwealth Brigade proceeded to its objective Hill 1036. On 31 March 1036 was occupied and the Brigade continued east to the valley of the Kap'yong River. On 8 April, the PPCLI was attacking across the 38th Parallel.
Now, with the UN Forces fighting along the 38th Parallel, a debate of sorts developed over where the conflict should progress from that point. Should the UN continue the attack north into China itself, or should they hunker down, dig in and begin negotiations with the North and Chinese. MacArthur wanted total victory even if it meant war with China. Truman wanted to dig in his heels and try to talk his way out of the conflict. These men soon butted heads and MacArthur was relieved of his command on 11 April 1951. MacArthur was replaced by General Mathew Ridgeway who had commanded the US XVIII Airborne Corps during WWII which fought alongside the 6th British Airborne Division in Germany. As MacArthur packed his bags, the UN forces continued to push past the 38th.
The prior enemy withdrawal was not due to overwhelming UN forces but a decision by the Chinese to create a more manageable front line utilizing high ground in the southern area of the Imjin River. There they reorganized and built up their supporting elements. With this achieved, they attacked the western and west central UN line on 22 April. This fell on the US 1st and 9th Corps and 6th ROK Division. The ROK Division was almost completely surrounded. It fell to the Commonwealth Brigade, which was in Corps reserve, to keep an escape route open through which the ROK Division could escape. This was in the valley of the Kap'yong River near its junction with the Pukhan River. It was a wide valley with high hills to either side. The strategy was to use the Brigade to plug all access routes to prevent the enemy from flowing down into the valley. The 3rd Royal Australian Regiment, supported by the 72nd US Tank Battalion, was situated on top of Hill 504, the 2nd PPCLI on top of Hill 677 and the British 1st Middlesex just south of the Patricias.
 The 27th had consisted of two British and one Australian infantry battalions, a New Zealand Field Regiment and the 60th Indian Field Ambulance.
However on 7 August 1950, Canada authorized the raising of a Canadian Army Special Force which was to meet the obligations under the UN Charter. They also committed to sending troops to join NATO forces in Europe (27th Canadian Infantry Brigade established on 4 May 1951). The commitment to the UN Forces in Korea was a volunteer force made up of members of the tiny active force and civilian recruits (18 month enlistment or more), many being WW II veterans. A rotation scheme was introduced to limit time spent on front-line service. The Special Force originally consisted of,
2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI)
2nd Battalion Royal 22nd Regiment ( The Vandoos ) (2 R22R)
2nd Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment (2 RCR)
"C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (LdSH [RC])
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA)
25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Signals Squadron
No. 57 Independent Field Squadron Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE)
No. 54 Canadian Transport Company, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC)
No. 25 Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC)
Since Canada did not have a centralized airborne capability during the Korean War, parachute trained members of the MSF were deployed integrated within the various battalions rotated to Korea. This not only included the RCR, PPCLI and R22R but also members of the 1st Light Battery (Parachute) Royal Canadian Artillery who served with the RCHA as well as men from the various Airborne Medical Sections. Men who individually qualified as paratroopers as part of non-MSF artillery, signals etc. also volunteered to go to Korea as part of these regular units. This is why you will see men in Korea with and without maroon berets and parachute badges serving in the same units.
In order to command the Canadians, on 8 August 1950 WWII veteran and ex-CO of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in NW Europe Brigadier J.M. Rockingham took Command of the 25th Brigade. On 15 August 1950, the 2nd Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was formed. The Battalion underwent a quick training scheme at CFB Wainwright and was shipped to Korea aboard the USS Private Joe P. Martinez on 25 November 1950.
After MacArthur landed at Inchon, linked up with forces driving north from Pusan, captured Pyongyang and continued driving north, it was thought that the Korean crisis was basically over. Therefore Canada decided to only commit one battalion for possible use as part of an occupation force. However between sailing from Seattle on 25 November and their arrival in Yokohama, Japan on 14 December, Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone’s 2nd Battalion of the PPCLI heard of the Chinese invasion of the north. This apparently took UN forces completely by surprise. After advancing as far north as the Yalu River, on 26 November US Forces were sent into a retreat that ultimately drove them back 64 miles south of Seoul by January.
 Re-designated Z Battery (Parachute) RCHA in 1953.
the same time placing Japanese weapons into the hands of the communists. It is argued that Marshall's intervention basically presented China on a platter to the communists. [i]
US General Albert Coady Wedemeyer (9 July 1897 - 17 December 1989) was General Chiang Kai-Shek’s (31 October 1887 - 5 April 1975) Chief of Staff and had proposed beefing up US and Nationalist Military strength and training. This not only applied to China but Wedemeyer also wanted Republican forces in Korea properly trained, equipped and motivated. However Truman would have none of it. He sent Marshall on his useless mission to attempt to achieve the impossible. So in short, Truman holds a large responsibility for the expulsion of the KMT to Formosa (Taiwan) and the stalemate in Korea. [ii]
The only man in Korea at that time that could win the war was MacArthur. He was now dismissed by Truman on 11 April 1951. Many left-leaning historians defend this move without bothering to explain how the US got to that point in China and Korea in the first place. They talk about Truman's "Europe First" stance by helping to establish NATO (4 April 1949) and a NATO Command, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 1951. However there would be no "Asia Second." The communists had already engulfed large portions of Asia so Truman and the west were the losers.
This forced Truman on July 1951 to basically seek peace at Panmunjom with absolutely no hand to play. It was not a matter of deciding where to draw a demarcation line and establish a demilitarized zone, the negotiations apparently stalled surrounding the issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The United States would not agree to the forcible repatriation of prisoners. So the bickering went on for another two years before a cease fire was finally agreed which allowed prisoners to go where they liked. The South gained 1,500 square miles of territory and a 2-mile-wide demilitarized zone was drawn up near the 38th parallel which still exists to this day. The complete failure of the Truman administration resulted in a Communist ideology which taught that "proletarian internationalism" was a duty of all communists. Apart from China, this resulted in a communist North Korea, a communist Vietnam, a communist Cambodia and Laos and almost resulted in a communist Burma and Malaya/Malaysia. North Korea now has the bomb and can strike Japan. They are continually developing missiles to extend their nuclear reach to North America.
After the invasion of the south, the United Nations (formed on 24 October 1945) voted on intervention in Korea. This resulted in 16 member-nations pledging to join forces to "resist" communist aggression. The Soviet Union boycotted the meeting so they were not able to use their veto, and at the time of the Korean War Communist China was not a member of the UN. Although Canada was amongst those 16 nations, it was not in a position to quickly react militarily. Like before WWII, the Liberal Government again reduced Canada's military to approximately 21,000 troops of all trades. It was primarily focussed on the defence of Canada with its core being the small Mobile Striking Force (MSF). Canada could only send air transport and naval assets. The Truman government in the US also made similar drastic cut backs to the US military at the end of WWII and they too had a difficult time reacting to the invasion. At first the US had to deploy units that were part of the occupation of Japan.
hypocritical attitude towards colonial governments. They stated that they would not support the reestablishment of colonial governments in SE Asia but obviously did not care to think that their replacement would likely be by Communists. Hypocritical because the United States itself occupied territory of its prior enemies which included colonies of Spain.
So with Truman playing catch up, he sent US Forces to assist the weak and not so enthusiastic forces of South Korean leader Syngman Rhee (1875-1965). The fighting at this stage mainly involved containing the communists. However by the summer of 1950, the US General of the Asian Theater General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) and Truman decided that the aim was to liberate Korea completely from the communists. This began with the battle of Inchon on 15 September 1950 and culminated in pushing the North Koreans back to the Yalu River near the border with China. This caused China concern; a China that was by this time completely communist.
The US under Truman could have averted what was about to happen and many other conflicts if it had more vigorously supported the Nationalist Chinese. Now the result of that dithering became evident. Communist China now felt threatened and this resulted in their leader Mao Zedong (1893-1976) sending Chinese troops into North Korea to turn the Americans back. Zedong threatened a wider war against the US if they did not stay away from the Yalu. Rather than call the communist bluff as advised by General MacArthur, Truman and his advisors buckled. While big with words, they worried about further aggression from China and the Soviets as well as the possibility of atomic warfare despite the fact that the only nation with a known deployable atomic bomb was the US. While the Soviets tested their first bomb in 1949, the Chinese did not test their first weapon until 1964. The speed at which the Soviets acquired a bomb was partially due to Klaus Fuchs, a pre-war German communist who handed Manhattan Project secrets to Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviets "tested" their first bomb in 1949, the author could not determine when a usable military weapon was available. The Soviets had difficulty in obtaining material to make their tests. This makes one wonder why, if the Western Allies knew back in WWII that Stalin was a backstabber, they bothered to negotiate with him at all at the end of that war. MacArthur desired going all out against the Chinese and in expressing this opinion was bluntly sacked by Truman. Rather than refer to Korea as the beginning of the Cold War, it should be remembered as the beginning of a "limited war" policy that poisoned and defeated many western military operations to the present day. A policy that left conflicts unresolved or completely lost at the wasteful cost of western lives. Leaders like MacArthur believed strongly that if you commit to war, you should go all out. While destructive, it finishes the violence quickly and in the long run saves lives and prevents future aggression.
Regardless, everything that Truman worried about came to fruition anyway. There was Soviet and Chinese communist aggression all over the globe and a full scale war in Korea did develop with the Chinese. So it did not matter if MacArthur went to war with China or not. As stated previously, all of this could have been averted if the US had committed itself to backing the KMT and its destruction of communism in China five years earlier.
At the end of WWII the Truman administration sent General Marshall (Marshall Mission) to China in order to attempt to negotiate a sort of coalition government between the communists and the KMT. This was ridiculous. The ensuing negotiations resulted in a lull in the pressure placed on the communists by the KMT who had bottled up the losing communists in two separate areas of China. The negotiations embargoed weapons and supplies to the KMT while at...
Canadian paratroopers sensed an ominous future. Sergeant Andy Anderson of "B" Company, No. 4 Platoon recalls,
"It appears as that we are not going to be allowed to cross into the Russian zone for any reason. Orders are that only one Battalion Jeep Courier is permitted per day to go through. I have no idea what the level of contact is, but from time to time we see the Colonel and other higher-ranking officers going through the lines. It is somewhat reassuring to know that some liaison is being maintained. At this point, it is very difficult for our men to comprehend the attitude of the Russians. On the surface at least, they seem more like an enemy than an ally." [i]
While some claim that the Korean War was the first military action of the cold war, the allied race to Wismar, in the opinion of many, marked the first action of the cold war. In addition to Denmark, the Soviets supported the overthrow of the elected government of Czechoslovakia by the communists in February 1948 and a similar scenario in Hungary over 1948-49 as well as the crisis in Berlin over 1948-49. So the prevailing attitude of the Soviets and their allies was obviously hostile.
With the back and forth skirmishing taking place in Korea, it was inevitable that the situation would boil over. On 25 June 1950, 75,000 of the Soviet-imposed dictator Kim Il Sung's (1912-1994) North Korean troops crossed the demarcation line and invaded the south. Apparently the Americans were shocked. However two months prior to the invasion, a US National Security Council Report recommended that the US use military force to contain communist expansionism wherever it threatened. President Harry Truman (1884-1972), made the statement,
"If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one place after another."
This obvious conclusion should have been reached before 1950. Now Truman had to deal with it. The North Koreans made it all the way to the Capital city in the south occupying Seoul on 28 June. The US then committed itself to war to stop the spread of communism. It should have already been known to Truman and his Democrats that communism had already spread throughout Asia before WW II had begun.
During WW II, apart from Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Chinese Kuo-Min-Tang (KMT) and local peoples, the biggest groups opposed to the Japanese were communist. These were largely Chinese inhabitants of other people’s lands; Chinese communists or those strongly influenced by the Soviets and Chinese Communists. They had already infiltrated much of SE Asia. After all, at that time, the choice was a Colonial Government, Communist Government or a Japanese Government. The communists were already active in killing their opposition and imposing their ways on the local populace; this from Burma, Malaya to Indo-China. This is when Ho Chi Minh's communists in Indo-China /Vietnam began to slaughter their way into power and totalitarian control, Minh ironically being influenced by a French Socialist named Marcel Cachin. He travelled to the Soviet Union and China to further his totalitarian schooling. In another ironic twist, he returned to North Indo-China and fought the Vichy French and Japanese with the assistance of the American OSS. Minh, like all of his communist counterparts around world first murdered anyone who stood in his way to achieve total power. Obviously this meant all opposition groups. This is why it always appears as though the communists have overwhelming support. The US assisted the Viet Minh not only because the Vichy were allied to Hitler but because they had a...
[i] Boegel, Gary.C, Boys of the Clouds, an Oral History of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 1942-45. Sergeant Andy Anderson of "B" Company, No. 4 Platoon pg 334, 7 May 1945.
with them. Churchill thought he could reason with them as he was left with no other choice. In truth, like Hitler, the Soviets wanted to engulf as much of the world with their twisted ideology as they could. After surviving Hitler's onslaught with the help of the Allies, the Soviet victory meant an enforcement of their ideology in the countries they occupied. In many cases they allowed the Germans to finish off any future opposition before they moved in. A good example is Poland and their posture on the opposite bank of the Vistula while Warsaw was completely reduced, along with any possible opposition to a Soviet occupation and future puppet regime.
While Churchill sought a workable relationship with the Soviets, this was largely due to his having to work with a weak-kneed United States that did absolutely nothing to stop the Soviets from engulfing as much of Europe as they could. Without them, the British had no clout. This did not mean that the US did not have advocates of blocking or even engaging in military action against the Soviets. Churchill did what he could to try to get Allied forces as far into Eastern Europe as possible in order to give those people a chance at freedom.
With the Soviets now in North Korea and helping the Communist Chinese they set to work enforcing their ideology in those territories and they set up a puppet regime dubbed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, “People's” basically meaning those left over after the purges. The difference being that the US-established regime in the south was intended to ultimately be democratic. It was dubbed the Republic of South Korea (ROK). Like all new regimes, it too had problems dealing with corruption. However corruption is not just a democratic / capitalist disease.
The regime in the north was a totalitarian regime under the control of the Soviets. Like today, many left-wing organizations use the term “Democratic” to attract supporters and dupe them into thinking that these are in fact democratic organizations. This is referred to as Democratic Centralism. This was a Leninist organizational system in which policy is decided centrally and is binding on all members. In other words, once all opposition is murdered, those who committed the murder get together to decide policy which they will inflict on all those they have gained control over. The only democracy involved is that the members of the central committee vote on what totalitarian policies they will enforce and how. And who will be shot or go to the gulag to make sure there is no dissension. Following Communist policy, the regime in the north did all they could to infiltrate into the south. The Republic then countered this infiltration. This soon developed into conflict. It is reported that at least 10,000 people were killed even before the Korean War began.
So Korea basically became another casualty of communism and inept Allied WWII diplomacy. After all, the Soviet track record up until the 1950s should not be trivialized. Firstly, during WWII the Soviets betrayed Allied special operations into Central and Eastern European nations. They went as far as to assassinate and betray Allied agents trying to establish resistance movements in these countries against the Nazis. They infiltrated Soviet spies into Allied Intelligence services partly to accomplish this goal as well as to learn more about Allied intelligence for post-war conquests. This included access to Manhattan Project secrets. They attempted to beat the Allies into Denmark in order to seize control of that country. They actually did take a territory in northern Norway and a strategic Danish Island. It was General Matt Ridgeway's XVIII Airborne Corps and the British 6th Airborne Division, including the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion that ultimately stopped the Soviet advance. Even at that time the...
THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953
The beginnings of the Korean War go back to the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. For without this revolution it is doubtful that a lot of things would have occurred over the next 36 years. It was arguably a catalyst for the rise of Hitler and, apart from World War II it was directly responsible for several conflicts thereafter. This includes the Korean War.
Like its bargaining with Hitler which prevented its involvement with Germany's invasion of the rest of non-axis Europe, the Soviets did not take part in the war in the Pacific because it had also signed a non-aggression agreement with Japan. This agreement did not end until August 1945. It was very convenient for both the Soviets and the Japanese. Therefore the bulk of the Pacific War fell to the United States with the bulk of the fighting in SE Asia falling to the British, Australians, New Zealanders as well as other European Colonial powers and local peoples.
Japan and Korea signed several treaties between 1876 and 1910. It was made a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and then annexed in 1910. The Japanese kept control over Korea until losing WWII and surrendering to the Allied Powers. Since the Soviet/Japanese non-aggression agreement expired in August 1945, just before the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, on 8 August the Soviets attacked the Japanese in Manchuria. They were able to drive the Japanese out of China and pushed them back into southern Korea.
With the end of the war in the Pacific, the United States occupied Southern Korea and on 10 August 1945 declared a line dividing Northern and Southern Korea close to the 38 degree Latitude (Parallel). For some odd reason, this division of Korea was agreed upon by the Soviets (Marxist Leninist Bolsheviks) and Americans. It countered what had been agreed at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 when the US, Britain and Nationalist Chinese agreed that any future government in Korea would be a free democratic government. After all, the United States fought the war in the Pacific, not the Soviets. A little foresight should have told Truman of the troubles to come. However, rather than demanding control of all of Korea, the US allowed the Soviets to occupy the north.During WW II it became obvious to the British that the Soviets could not be trusted. However they required the Soviets to finish Hitler and vice versa. The British and US reluctantly worked...
 A situation which was as much their fault as anyone else's having propped up Bolshevik groups within Germany during the inter-war years and causing unrest inflaming the likes of Hitler who was himself a Socialist but a "National Socialist" opposed to the Soviet system of "Individualized Socialism." Similarly the Soviets used the same tactics later in the UK and the West when they, oddly, signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. After infiltrating labour Unions in the West, they mounted strikes at a time when war production was vital to the survival of Britain. Ironically, after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, they came crawling to Churchill to ask for help.
SF 1022 Departure Seattle 28 March 1951. Major or the Royal Canadian Dragoons.
SF 1250 Members of LSH at Fort Lewis April 51
SF 1103 Arrival of supplies at Cdn Base April 51
April 1951 PPCLI Combat Area SF 1341
SF 8949 LSH Korea 11 Feb 54 crossing the 38th.
SF 9098 Korea vets 54
SF 9234 homeward bound w souvenirs 24 March 54
SF 9256 2 Queens Own Rifles arrives Korea 12 March 54
EC 7064 RCR Mortar Team at end of 1953
SF 8415 Lt Curmi Archbishop Roy Korea 4 Nov 53
SF 8371 RCR CP October 53
SF 8374 3 RCR Oct 53
SF 8662 War Correspondent fliming of S Korean KATCOM being trained by Cdn Forces 53
SF 7136 3 R22R NAFFI 19 July 53
SF 5918 RCR Chowing down
WC 9476 returning from Korea PPCLI 17 April 53
SF 8025 3 PPCLI with valley behind Sept 53
SF 8024 PPCLI build up defenses Sept 53
WC 9404 Korea replacement draft 10 April 53 R22R
SF 8200 Mil Pol singing roads Aug Sept 53 after cease fire
SF 7187 3 PPCLI with Vickers Aug Sept 53
SF 8162 R22R at South DMZ Aug 53
SF 8075 July Aug 53 return of prisoners of war from north
SF 8203 Aug Sept 53
SF 8021 25 CIB build up defenses Sept 53
SF 8264 3 RCR 26 Sept 53
SF 5914 RCR on scheme Korea 11 Feb 53
SF 8223 LSH Korea Sept 53
SF 8226 Sept 53 81st Field Regt Korea
SF 8300 Oct 53.
SF 6068 PPCLI Snipers 19 March 53
SF 6225 Service Corps on leave Tokyo March 53
SF 6226 Service Corps on leave Tokyo March 53
SF 5971 Feb/March 53 a strange souvenir
SF 6078 23 Field Sqdn RCE 4 Sect 2 Troop 21 March 53 Prisoners
SF 5951 RCAMC innoculaes Korean Baby Feb 53
SF 6230 Cpls C W Pelley and D Lemoine MM NFld 5 April 53
SF 7110 3 RCR Korea July 53
SF 5905 LSH Korea Feb 53
SF 5911 RCR on scheme with US M20 75mm recoilless rifle in Korea 11 Feb 53
SF 5903 Feb 53
SF 6796 Members of 3 R22R on 14 June 53 wearing home made stocking caps and British windproof camo pull overs.
SF 6589 May 53 Canadians in front of new British Centurian Tank
SF 6663 LSH A Sqdn June 53
SF 6643 Sniper scope with infra red night site attachment on US M1/2 Carbine -Patrol School 3 June 53
SF 6574 Draft of soldiers returning home PPCLI paratroops 14 May 53
SF 6147 8 April 53 Troops arrive Far East Kure Pusan R22R
SF 6670 PPCLI w helmet liner June 53
CC-7157 August 1953 RCR
SF 6556 May 53 LSH
SF 6479 Paratrooper of the R22R returning home early 53
SF 6365 RCEME April 53
SF 5730 LSH Tanks Korea circa Dec 1952
SF 5744 Beer ration 5 Dec 1952
SF 5692 LSH with R22R 4 December 1952
SF 5742 Wounded member of the PPCLI 5 December 1952 being treated by US Army Lieutenant Nurse at a MASH
SF 5700 Major R. F. Bruce PPCLI 4 Dec 1952
SF-5755 1 R22R with Santa Dec 1952
SF 5734 B Coy PPCLI in Combat 16 Dec 1952
SF 5702 Maj J A Huot 4 Dec 52 R22R
SF-5694 R22R Korea 4 December 1952
SF 5704 Lt. Col. John Ralph Cameron PPCLI Korea Nov 1952
SF-5747 20 Nov 52 R22R Korea
WC 9058 R22R Chicoutimi to Korea circa April 1952
SF 5824 Cdn Mil Provost Dec 52.
 Boegel, Gary.C, Boys of the Clouds, an Oral History of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 1942-45. Sergeant Andy Anderson of "B" Company, No. 4 Platoon pg 334, 7 May 1945.
1. Giesler, Patricia Valour Remembered Directorate of Public Affairs, Veterans Affairs Canada 1990
2. Fiarlie, Lt. Col. Herbert Strange Battleground. Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea, Queens Printer, 1966.
3. Marteinson, John We Stand On Guard, An Illustrated History of the Canadan Army, Ovale Publications 1992.
To see maps relating to the various stages of Canada's involvement in the Korean War please refer to
SF 1350 Armed Forces Radio April 51 Tokyo
SF 1338 17 April 51 2 PPCLI Combat
SF 1526 Ex Charlie Horse 11 May 51
SF 1571 Refugees moving south from Suwan.
SF 1360 2 PPCLI Korea 23 April 51
SF 1296 PPCLI in combat 13-16 April 1951 4
SF 1579 2 PPCLI in rear area 19 May 51 gets innoculation for many illnesses prevelent in Korea
SF 1093 Rockingham visits 2 PPCLI at training base 4 April 51
SF 1286 2 PPCLI in combat 13-16 April 51
SF 1352 2 PPCLI at the front 23 April 51
SF 1136 Depart from Seattle 9 April 51 R22R
SF 1355 23 April 51 2 PPCLI Korea
SF 1772 2 PPCLI advances across Imjin 6 June 51
SF Departure from Seattle 9 April 51 R22R
RCR getting inoculated April 51
Cdn arrival at training base Korea 51
SF 1356 2 PPCLI Korea 23 April 51
RCR casualties 30 May 51
Public Relations Unit April 51
SF 1016 March 1951 departure Seattle
SF 1365 M-10 Tank Destroyer of the LSH being off loaded in Korea April 51
SF 1456 Arriving in Korea end of April 51
SF 1275 PPCLI in combat 13-16 April 51
SF 1157 Members of 2 RCHA in April 51 Fort Lewis.
PHOTOS 25TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE 1952-1953
SF 10289 Queens Own Rifles in KOREA
WC 9708 Korea Vets
SF 8385 71 Workshop Platoon 56 Transport Company RCASC
SF 8954 Korea Dog Training 54
SF 10182 Black Watch in Korea
SF 9151 R22R in Korea 1954
SF 9007 PPCLI Arrive ome from Korea Feb 54
SF 9220 March 54.
SF 10182 Black Watch in Korea
SF 9257 2 QOR arrives Korea 24 March 54
SF 8384 RCASC producing useful signs
SF 9014 20 Feb 54 RCR
SF 8955 Dog Training 54 Korea RCR
Canadians about to depart for Korea playing craps. Note the Black veteran of WWII looking lucky.
SF 10447 3 Cdn field Ambulance 1954
SF 9369 4 Canadian Grenadier Guards on their way to Korea 1954
SF 9525 RCHA in Korea 1954
SF 1044 (10411?) Queens Own Rifles on way to Korea March 1954